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 Toshio’s Movie Castle: A Historical Overview of Studio Ghibli’s Collaboration and 
Promotional Strategies 
 
Shiro Yoshioka 
 
I believe that the uniqueness of Studio Ghibli lies in the fact that it is successful in 
maintaining both ‘quality of the content [of its films]’ and ‘commercial success.’ 
However great works one continues to create with great ambition, in a country like 
Japan where the government is not particularly interested in protecting film industry, 
by simply doing that [creating good films with high ambition], one cannot keep 
creating films for a long time due to financial difficulties in maintaining the 
business. 
― Toshio Suzuki, Producer, Studio Ghibli 
(Suzuki 1996: 130)  
 
Why are ‘Ghibli films’ so popular both in and outside Japan? One very simple possible 
answer to the question is: the films are aesthetically and thematically superb. That may 
well be true. However, at the same time, it is only half true. As Suzuki Toshio, the 
producer for Studio Ghibli says in his essay quoted above, however great ‘Ghibli films’ 
are, they did not become Japan’s, and even the world’s, favourite simply because of 
their aesthetic and thematic splendour. Unlike typical TV animation that is often created 
under strictly restricted schedule and budget, films created by Ghibli are high profile, 
high stake features that are prepared over years and with a budget of hundreds of 
millions of yen. As such, the films, just like any other products, need to be promoted 
and sold so that the studio can make profit and keep the business running. There also 
have to be sponsors. We have to note that the studio has its own mechanism to finance, 
promote and sell its films, and that there is a man by the name of Suzuki Toshio who is 
responsible for that mechanism. As discussed throughout this article, it is no that Suzuki 
developed some kind of revolutionary mechanism to sell films or he is the only person 
responsible for making important decisions on the studio. However, he did play crucial 
role at key moments of the studio by establishing connections with companies and 
people in and outside the film industry. He asked for and/or followed their advice and as 
discussed in detail below, that greatly contributed to commercial success of Ghibli films. 
Therefore, it hardly is an overstatement to say that without Suzuki, the studio would not 
be as successful as it is, or it might not even have come into existence because  as 
detailed in the next section of this article, he is the person who played a crucial role in 
founding the studio by liaising between the creators and the sponsors as well as 
undertaking practical work for establishing the studio as a company.  
This article will examine how Suzuki developed promotional strategies for Studio 
Ghibli. Knowing about his strategies as well as his background, especially his link with 
publishing house Tokuma shoten, will enable us to understand key factors that 
contributed to current fame of the studio, besides the quality of its products. Suzuki has 
spoken and written extensively about history of Ghibli as well as himself. This article 
will follow Suzuki’s career chronologically, mainly using his interviews and essays few 
of which are available in English. This approach will allow us to only look at ‘official’ 
history as it is presented by Ghibli and Suzuki. However, due to paucity of materials by 
Suzuki in English, at this stage I believe it is important for those who do not read or 
speak Japanese to have access to such ‘official’ history so that it can be developed into 
further research on the subject. The article will consist of three sections: the first one 
will overview Suzuki’s personal background, how he came to work with Miyazaki and 
Takahata, and his contribution to founding of the studio. The second section will be on 
his early days at Ghibli up to Majo no takkyūbin/Kiki’s Delivery Service (Miyazaki, 
1989). It is in this period that Suzuki learned significance of marketing as a way to 
allow creators to continue to create films and built up the system of promoting the 
studio’s films by active use of tie-in campaigns and association with other media 
companies, especially television station Nippon terebi hōsōmō (Nippon Television 
Network Corporation, hereafter NTV). The third section will focus on development in 
the 1990s. I will argue that the phenomenal success of Mononokehime/Princess 
Mononoke (Miyazaki, 1997) owes much the massive promotion campaign and strategic 
‘occupation’ of cinemas all over Japan planned by Suzuki.  
 
The early days 
Suzuki’s link with anime/manga as well as film in general began in his childhood. His 
love and knowledge of these media would eventually lead him to Ghibli as seen in brief 
description of his life below. He was born in Nagoya in 1948. His family owned a 
business that produced and sold clothes. The family was upper-middle class. The 
Suzukis were the second family to have a TV set in their neighbourhood. Suzuki’s 
parents liked films, and they often took him to cinema. While his mother preferred 
western films, father liked Japanese ones. His father was also good at drawing pictures 
and liked manga. Suzuki recalls that his father bought many manga magazines and piled 
them up in a room, so Suzuki often got into the room since when it was still dark and 
spent the whole day there. (Suzuki 2011: 227-230)  
After graduating from Keiō University, Suzuki joined publishing house Tokuma 
shoten in 1972. He wrote various articles about topics ranging from gossip and scandals 
to social and political issues for weekly magazine Asahi geinō. He was also involved in 
a short-lived manga magazine Komikku & komikku/Comic & Comic. As an editor, he 
worked closely with many manga artists and also film directors who wrote plots for 
some of the manga in the magazine. Although he enjoyed writing for the weekly 
magazine, he was forced to leave the editorial office after he had a personal conflict 
with his boss: he and Suzuki often had conflicts and one day, he told Suzuki to 
interview eight people with the deadline on the next day. Suzuki told him that it was 
impossible to finish in time by himself and asked for an assistant. The boss simply said 
‘Okay, so you cannot do this by yourself’ and stopped asking him to do any work since 
then. (Suzuki 2013a: 65-82)  
He then joined editorial board of a magazine Terebi rando/TV Land. The magazine 
was for children mainly featuring heroes of TV shows and anime, but it was not selling 
well. Hideo Ogata, the chief editor of the magazine, tried various ways to boost the 
sales. One of them was to publish a series of extra volumes focusing on a single anime 
series targeting slightly older readers. The series was titled Roman arubamu/Roman 
Album, and the first volume was on the hugely popular anime franchise Uchūsenkan 
Yamato/Space Battleship Yamato. The series turned out to be successful, and still 
continues today. (Ogata 2004: 13-15, 23-24, 44-47) Having realized how popular anime 
was, Ogata decided to publish a magazine specializing in anime, which would be later 
named Animage/Animēju, and Suzuki embarked on the project. However, although he 
liked manga, Suzuki had no knowledge of anime. To write articles for the inaugural 
issue of the magazine and learn about anime, he met three high school girls Ogata knew. 
The girls told Suzuki about anime including popular works at the time and also classics. 
One of the classics they mentioned was Isao Takahata’s Taiyō no ōji Horusu no 
daibōken/Horus: Prince of the Sun (1968). Before he could see the film, he decided to 
interview Takahata as well as Miyazaki, who also worked on the film, because very 
little time was left before the deadline for the article. Suzuki’s first impression of the 
two men was that they were ‘weirdos’: Takahata, talking for an hour over the phone, 
told Suzuki why he did not want to have the interview, and Miyazaki, on the other hand, 
insisted that he have sixteen pages for the interview. (Suzuki 2013a: 92) Upon seeing 
the film, however, Suzuki was captivated. He later said that the film changed life. 
(Suzuki 2013a: 94) He recalled that he was surprised because Takahata had created a 
cartoon film with the Vietnam War in mind. (Suzuki 2013a: 93) Thus, the long 
association between Suzuki as well as Tokuma shoten and the two directors began. As a 
consequence, the August 1981 issue of Animage became the first magazine to feature 
Miyazaki. The issue sold 320,000 copies while the average of issues up to July in the 
year was 270,000. (Ogata 2004: 147) Furthermore, the manga version of Kaze no tani 
no Naushika/Nausicaa of the Valley of the Wind by Miyazaki began in the February 
1982 issue of the magazine. Miyazaki has jokingly recalled that he was persuaded into 
serializing the manga after repeatedly talking with Suzuki and Mitsuru Kameyama, 
another editor of Animage, because he felt obliged for the coffee they bought for him at 
every meeting. (Miyazaki 2013: 92) 
The manga turned out to be very popular. The sales of the issue of Animage in which 
Nausicaa started jumped up by 20,000 copies from the previous month. (Ogata 2004: 
163) Encouraged by the reaction, Ogata began to think of the possibility of making the 
manga into a short film. Yasuyoshi Tokuma, the president of Tokuma shoten, was keen 
to expand his business beyond print media by collaborating with other audio and visual 
media companies, so he supported the project. Eventually the project grew into a feature 
film and was released in 1984. Ever since, Tokuma shoten has continued to be involved 
in production of films by Miyazaki and Takahata, and once Ghibli was established, 
maintained close link with the studio by publishing various print and audio materials. 
While it was Ogata and Tokuma who actually made decisions, the link between 
Takahata, Miyazaki and Tokuma shoten would have not existed unless Suzuki 
‘discovered’ them in the first place. 
Suzuki played some important roles in the production of the film version of Nausicaa. 
For example, Miyazaki insisted that Takahata be the producer of the film, but Takahata 
kept on refusing. Since Suzuki followed production of a film by Takahata in 1981 for 
Animage, Suzuki basically ‘met him every day.’ (Suzuki 2013a: 106) Seeing Miyazaki 
burst into tears one evening saying that while he had devoted everything to Takahata in 
his youth when they were colleagues at Tōei animation studio, Takahata did nothing for 
him, Suzuki did something he never did again: he, shouted at Takahata, blaming 
Takahata for deserting his best friend when Miyazaki needed help. As a result, Takahata 
finally agreed to be the producer. (Suzuki 2013a: 114-115) Suzuki also helped Takahata 
as the producer in finding animators and asking Tokuma shoten for more funds. (119)  
Additionally, Suzuki influenced the content of Nausicaa. In Miyazaki’s original story 
board, the ending of the story was different from what it is now in the film. Instead of 
Nausicaa being hit by rampaging Ōmu, the story ends abruptly when Nausicaa lands in 
front of them. Suzuki found the ending unnatural and discussed it with Takahata, who 
agreed with the view. Eventually they concluded that the ending should be changed to 
what it is now, and persuaded Miyazaki. (Suzuki 2014a: 48) Suzuki continued to have 
some influence on the themes and content of the studio’s films, especially those by 
Miyazaki and Takahata, including Miyazaki’s Kaze tachinu/The Wind Rises (2013). It 
was Suzuki who persuaded Miyazaki to create a film on the Zero fighter and its designer. 
(Suzuki 2014a, 213-214) In the case of Miyazaki’s Mononokehime/Princess Mononoke 
(1997), Suzuki even changed the title of the film from Ashitaka sekki as originally 
proposed by Miyazaki without his consent. (Suzuki 2014a: 86-87; Miyazaki 2002: 169; 
Miyazaki and Yōrō 2002: 38-39) 
The completed film of Nausicaa brought 915,000 audience members to cinemas 
earning 742 million yen. (Kanō 2006: 65) However, at this stage, Suzuki claims he was 
not interested in commercial success of the film because all he cared about was to 
simply create the film. (Suzuki 2013a: 124) As discussed in the next section, his attitude 
remained the same until he actually confronted the possibility that Miyazaki and 
Takahata could no longer create films due to their lack of commercial success He was 
not active in promoting the film, either. Promotion and advertising were left for 
advertising agency Hakuhōdō, which funded the project together with Tokuma shoten, 
and Meijā, an agency specializing in promotion of films. It was from Tenkū no shiro 
Rapyuta/Castle in the Sky (Miyazaki, 1985) that Suzuki began to pay more attention to 
promotion and funding. 
 
Foundation of Ghibli and strategies for promotion 
The next film Miyazaki created was Castle in the Sky. Tokuma shoten was eager to fund 
the project. However, the problem with the film was that there was no animation studio 
which Miyazaki could use as his base. The studio that had created Nausicaa was no 
longer in business. Takahata, who agreed to be the producer again, and Suzuki asked 
various studios they knew for cooperation, only to be rejected. Eventually, Takahata 
decided that the best solution would be to found a new studio to be owned by Tokuma 
shoten. (Suzuki 2013b: 55-56; Studio Ghibli 2013a: 33) Suzuki, representing the 
editorial board of Animage, proposed Takahata’s decisionto Yasuyoshi Tokuma . 
Tokuma approved the proposal, and Suzuki undertook the practical work for founding 
the studio, such as converting a company owned by Tokuma shoten that only existed on 
paper into Studio Ghibli, and finding an actual building to be used as the studio.(Studio 
Ghibli 2013a: 33; Suzuki 2013b: 56-57) Again, it was Takahata and Tokuma who made 
the actual decision, However, had there not been for the connection between them, 
which owes to Suzuki, in the first place, Studio Ghibli as we know it today may not 
have existed at all. 
It was since Castle in the Sky that Suzuki began to be involved in the process of 
promotion and negotiation with sponsors. Working together with Takahata, Suzuki 
recalls learning tips on dealing with tie-in partners. One particularly important lesson 
was that the rights to use materials from the film including the characters in 
advertisements and other materials for tie-in should be strictly under control of the 
studio and creator rather than the partner companies. For Castle in the Sky, Toshiba and 
food company Ajinomoto became tie-in partners. Toshiba produced a ‘Rapyuta [the 
original Japanese title of Castle in the Sky] version’ hi-fi system and Ajinomoto sold a 
juice drink named ‘Tenkū no shiro Rapyuta,’ exactly the same as the title of the film. In 
the first contract they presented to Takahata, these companies had the rights to use any 
materials from the film freely in their advertisements. Takahata, however, did not accept 
the item in the contract. Instead, he only allowed them to use the logo of the film. 
Suzuki later recalled that ‘that was the first time that I learned what a contract is all 
about.’ (Suzuki 2013a: 133) The actual advertisements for the juice drink featured 
live-action footage or photographs with two actors in outfits resembling the main 
characters’ sitting in a flying machine that, again, was similar to the one seen in the 
film.  
Another lesson Suzuki learned through the experience of working with these 
companies was that he should not accept any funds from tie-in partners. For Castle in 
the Sky, the two partners also paid part of the production cost of the film when Tokuma 
shoten fell short. However, as Suzuki sees it, depending on these partners as sponsors 
can compromise the authority of the creator and the studio over the use of materials in 
advertisements and lead to a risk of advertisements that are totally different from the 
actual film being made simply for promotion of the tie-in products rather than the film 
itself. Actually in the case of Nausicaa, promoting the title of the film was prioritized, 
and as a result, there were a number of collaborations that had nothing to do with the 
actual content of the film. For example, advertising agency Hakuhōdō organised a 
campaign titled ‘Nausicaa Girl.’ This was a public audition for a young female aidoru 
who would sing the theme song of the film. Out of 7,611 applications, Yasuda Narumi 
was chosen, but her song titled Kaze no tani no Naushika/Nausicaa of the Valley of the 
Wind was never used in the film. (Kanō 2006: 63) Takahata was disdainful about the 
campaign because it totally ignored the actual content of the film. (Komatsubara 1984: 
66) Takahata’s rejection of the contract for Castle in the Sky can be because of this 
previous experience.  
The decision not to allow the tie-in partners to use materials from the film, however, 
was problematic because it curtailed the possibilities regarding the promotion of the 
tie-in products and the film. The juice drink did not sell well even though it was 
released in summer, the best season for sales of soft drinks. (Suzuki 2005: 92) The film 
itself was not as successful as Nausicaa, either. The audience numbers and revenue fell 
to 775,000 and 583 million yen respectively. (Studio Ghibli 2013a: 46) The experience 
left strong impression on Suzuki. Later when Suzuki began to establish strategies for 
promotion of films after establishment of Ghibli,, he made it clear that tie-in projects for 
Ghibli films would not involve any exchange of funds, and while the tie-in partners are 
allowed to use materials from the films, the way they are used is strictly controlled by 
the studio. (Studio Ghibli 2013a: 46) In the next section we will see how that works, 
using Kiki’s Delivery Service as an example. 
 
Establishment of the ‘Ghibli method’: Kiki’s Delivery Service  
The double bill of Miyazaki’s Tonari no Totoro/My Neighbor Totoro and Takahata’s 
Hotaru no haka/Grave of the Fireflies (1987), the second project by the studio, was 
marginally more successful than Castle in the Sky with audience figures of 801,000 and 
588 million yen of revenue. However, the figures account for two films rather than one.  
(Studio Ghibli 2013b, 37) One significant development for Totoro was the creation of 
character merchandise. The popularity of Totoro surged after the screening was over. 
One of the reasons was the stuffed toys of the main character Totoro, which were first 
sold in 1988. These were originally displayed in cinemas before the film was released. 
They turned out to be popular, and a division of Tokuma shoten mass-produced them. 
(Kanō 2006: 125) In 1989, the film was shown on TV for the first time as a part of 
promotion for Majo no takkyūbin/Kiki’s Delivery Service (Miyazaki, 1989), as discussed 
in a moment. In the programme, thirty stuffed toys of Totoro were given to the viewers 
after a draw which attracted more than 300,000 entries. (Anon. 1989: 38) The 
merchandise contributed to popularity of the film, but it was not an integral part of 
promotion campaign. Although these toys helped to ameliorate the deficits from the 
production, Suzuki was, and still is, determined that ‘the film comes first, then the 
merchandises’ and ‘the content [of the film] should never be changed for the sake of 
[selling] merchandise.’ (Suzuki 2014a: 84) He even says that he was careful so that the 
sales of merchandises stay within a certain limit of overall sale of products of the studio 
because Ghibli is a company made to sell films more than anything else. (Suzuki 2014a: 
243)  
As a result of continuous decline in audience numbers and revenue at cinemas across 
the first two projects by Ghibli, by the time the studio embarked on its third project 
Kiki’s Delivery Service, there was scepticism within the film industry on the outlook of 
the studio. As Suzuki famously and repeatedly recollects, one producer at the distributor 
Tōei told him that Kiki would be the last film for Miyazaki, and the company agreed to 
distribute the film only because Japanese logistics giant Yamato un’yu was backing the 
project. (Kajiyama 2004: 30-31) Even after Totoro, Suzuki ‘did not care even if [the 
film] did not attract the audience as long as we could make something confidently.’ 
(Suzuki 2013a: 158) However, the remark by the Tōei producer upset and infuriated him. 
Suzuki was now determined to make the film commercially successful. He turned to TV 
station Nippon terebi hōsōmō (NTV), asking for sponsorship because he simply 
believed that involving a TV station would make the film more successful. (Suzuki 
2013a: 158)  
NTV already had a link with Tokuma shoten. In the early 1980s the station bought the 
right to broadcast Miyazaki’s first feature film Rupan III sei: Kariosutoro no 
shiro/Lupin III: Castle of Cagliostro (1979). Whenever the film was shown on NTV, the 
viewing rate was always over 20 per cent, which is remarkably high for Japanese 
television programme. Later, Tokuma shoten, under initiative of Ogata, negotiated with 
NTV for the exclusive rights for broadcasting Nausicaa and also Castle in the Sky. NTV 
agreed to buy both films, and they boasted high viewing rates once put on the small 
screen. (Yokoyama 2004: 289-290) One important reason for Tokuma shoten to 
approach NTV for broadcasting rights for Nausicaa was that, unlike other stations that 
insisted the films be shown from 7pm assuming that the main audience would be 
children, NTV offered to show the film from 9pm. The decision was right because when 
the film was broadcast, it succeeded in appealing to adult audiences, and the viewing 
rate of the first broadcast was as high as 16 per cent. (Kajiyama 2004: 33) The 
convention of broadcasting Ghibli films from 9pm still continues today. Based on these 
successes, NTV readily accepted the sponsorship proposal for Kiki, joining Tokuma 
shtoten and Yamato un’yu. It still remains as one of the sponsors and an important 
player in promoting Ghibli films to this day. 
The first thing Suzuki did at NTV, prompted by Seiji Okuda, the man responsible for 
promotion of the film at NTV, was to meet various directors and producers within the 
station, giving away merchandise from previous Studio Ghibli films. At the time, within 
the TV station, it was only young directors who knew Miyazaki’s name. Therefore, it 
was necessary to promote the film to various other people within the station so that they 
would cooperate in promoting the film during their programmes. (Okuda 2015a: 53)  
The strategy for actually promoting the film on television devised by Okuda was 
simple but extensive and rigorous. The campaign was mainly three-fold:  
 
 Continuous exposure: Having a girl dressed as Kiki, the protagonist of the film, 
stand behind the broadcaster in the station’s daily live morning show Zūmu in!! 
Asa!/Zoom in!! Morning! for six months up to the release of the film1  
 Special programmes on the film and Miyazaki: A programme consisting of 
interviews with young girls of the age of the protagonist including Suzuki’s 
daughter, to find out what they feel about their lives, as well as a fly-on-the-wall 
documentary about the production of the film 
 Denpa jakku (Hijacking of the airwaves): Promoting the film in every possible 
programme all day as well as showing past films by Miyazaki. 
(Okuda 2015a: 52) 
 
In addition, Miyazaki appeared on NTV’s news shows for interviews. Campaigns were 
also held outside Tokyo, where the station is based, because as with all other Japanese 
TV stations, NTV has a string of keiretsu or affiliated TV and radio stations all over the 
country. For example, Miyazaki, along with Suzuki and Okuda, did a tour of Nagoya, 
Osaka and Fukuoka, wherein Miyazaki appeared in regional programmes for TV and 
radio as well as having interviews with newspapers and magazines. He also appeared in 
Zūmu in!! Asa! while he was in Fukuoka. (Okuda 2015a: 52-55) 
The tie-in advertising was further developed from Castle in the Sky. Unlike the 
previous film, advertisements for Kiki did feature screen captures from the film. The 
advertisement by Yamato un’yu, for example, carries a picture captured from the film 
where the protagonist Kiki and her cat Jiji are looking out of a window. However, the 
accompanying text makes no direct reference to the film apart from the very last 
sentence that says ‘Yamato un’yu wa Majo no takkyūbin no seisaku ni sanka shite imasu 
(Yamato un’yu sponsors production of Kiki’s Delivery Service).’ At the bottom of the 
advertisement are the title of the film and credits for the director, the author of the 
original book and sponsors placed side by side with corporate logo of Yamato un’yu. 
The main copy at the top as well as the rest of the text emphasizes how caring and 
humane the services provided by the logistics company were, as if a mother cat cares for 
her kittens, alluding to the logo of the company featuring a black cat carrying its kitten 
and also Jiji the black cat in the film. In Castle in the Sky, the title of the film was given 
to the juice drink and used simply to publicise the name of the film and also to boost the 
sales of the drink if the film turned out to be popular. However, the content of the film 
was not reflected either in the product itself or advertisements. In Kiki, on the other 
hand, at the nexus of the advertisements was the image – caring and warm – associated 
with the logistics company and the film.  
This type of campaign became a regular feature of ensuing Ghibli films. Suzuki states 
that the tie-in partners are willing to run campaigns that activelyptomote the fact that the 
partners are in support of Ghibli and its projects rather than simply promote their own 
products using the film as a catalyst. According to him, that is because the general 
public in Japan has a very strong positive image about the studio’s films, and by 
announcing that they are in support of the films, the tie-in partners can also associate 
themselves with the image of the films and the studio. (Suzuki 1996: 130) Kiki became 
the most successful film of the year earning 2.17 billion yen with audiences of 2.64 
million.(Studio Ghibli 2013c: 45) Together with Totoro, whose popularity surged after 
TV broadcast as a part of promotion for Kiki, the success of Kiki’s Delivery Service 
firmly established the reputations of Miyazaki and the studio.  
 
The ‘Suzuki theory’: Princess Mononoke 
During production of Kiki’s Delivery Service, Miyazaki was thinking about closing 
Studio Ghibli once the project was over because in his view, in three years after 
foundation or after completing three projects, members of staff at animation studio 
begin to lose passion for their work and ‘enter a lethargic stage,’ making both the studio 
itself and its creations become conservative. (Miyazaki 2014: 89) Hearing the idea, 
Suzuki opposed. After discussions, they decided that the studio would continue by 
employing animators as full-time employees of the studio rather than on contract only 
for the periods of production. To fully support the studio, Suzuki quit Tokuma shoten 
and joined the studio as the producer. (Studio Ghibli 2014: 49-50, 52) As a result, 
Suzuki now began to fully and solely engage with the studio rather than a go-between 
for the studio and Tokuma shoten. 
The strategies for promotion developed for Kiki were further enhanced in the films 
that followed. By the time of Miyazaki’s Mononokehime/Princess Mononoke, Suzuki 
came to believe that the revenue from a film equals the amount of budget for publicity. 
(Okuda 2015b: 92) For the studio, Mononoke was a high-stakes and high-risk project 
because of its large budget of more than 2 billion yen. The break-even-point of the film 
was estimated to be at least 3.6 billion yen, which was well beyond 2.7 billion yen, the 
highest revenue for the studio’s films made by Miyazaki’s Kurenai no buta/Porco Rosso 
in 1992, thanks to, among other factors, extensive promotional campaign involving 
NTV, Tokuma shoten and the sponsor of the film Japan Air Lines. The campaign 
included an airship featuring the logo of the film and the sponsor as well as an image of 
the protagonist of the film flying over the Greater Tokyo area. (Studio Ghibli 2015: 30; 
Anon, 1996: 49) Suzuki decided to set a bold target. Before eventually raising the bar to 
6 billion yen with an ambition to break the record of most successful film shown in 
Japan (5.7 billion), he was aiming at 5 billion yen and planned to run promotional 
campaigns that were worth the same amount. At a ‘gasshuku’ (training camp) in which 
stakeholders of the film stayed in accommodation owned by NTV for two days, Suzuki 
presented the details of his plan, indicating the breakdown as follows: 
 
 Funds for publicity paid by the distributor Tōhō: 500 million yen 
 Funds for publicity paid by the studio and other sponsors: 200 million yen 
 Tie-in projects with Nippon Life Insurance Company: an equivalent of 1 billion 
yen 
 Promotion of Totoro and Mimi o sumaseba/Whisper of the Heart ( Kondō, 1995), 
two previous works of the studio sold by Buena Vista Home Entertainment as 
VHS/DVD 
 Collaboration with newspapers the Yomiuri shinbun and Sports Nippon 
 TV programmes on NTV and its regional associates as well as Japanese public 
broadcasting station NHK 
 Collaboration with Tokuma shoten [to publish books, magazines and other print 
materials promoting the film, the studio and Miyazaki] 
 Previews organized by another publishing house, Kōdansha, inviting 10,000 
people through twenty seven magazines published by the company 
 Publicity campaigns in music stores by Tokuma Japan Communications, the 
company responsible for selling CDs related to Ghibli 
 Events at Takashimaya department stores 
 Other publicity campaigns (Okuda 2015b: 91-92)  
 
Under Suzuki’s leadership most of these were materialized together with conventional 
promotional strategies including broadcast of past Ghibli films on NTV, a documentary 
following the production of the film which was eventually made into a programme to be 
sold as VHS/DVD and a promotional tour by Miyazaki and Suzuki to no less than 20 
destinations around Japan. Newspapers and magazines carried numerous advertisements 
and feature articles during the period leading to the release. (Kanō 2006: 210) The total 
number of pages of magazine articles featuring the film reached 109. (Anon. 1997: 22)  
Suzuki was actively involved in the production of these advertisements by deciding the 
overall layout of the advertisements especially the size and position of the main copy. 
(Studio Ghibli 2002: 344)  
While many of these promotional ideas began with Kiki, one notable addition is the 
previews in association with publishing house Kōdansha. These were first organized for 
Porco Rosso by JAL, NTV, Tokuma shoten and Kōdansha, having no less than 32 
previews in fifteen days in cities all over Japan. (Anon, 1996: 49) In an interview, 
Suzuki has explained that these previews were doubly effective because the audience 
would spread positive word of mouth and because they would function as publicity 
when the previews were announced on NTV programmes. (Suzuki 2014b: 54) For 
Mononoke, 130 previews were planned, but due to delay in production, there actually 
were 70. (Kanō 2006: 210) At the ‘camp,’ Suzuki also explained that if the distributor 
Tōhō cooperated so that Mononke could be shown at its ‘best cinemas,’ that is to say 
prestigious, larger and conveniently located ones all over Japan, then the revenue would 
reach the target of 5 billion yen. (Okuda 2015b: 92) 
Through the experience with Porco Rosso and Takahata’s Heisei tanuki gassen 
ponpoko/Pom Poko (1994), Suzuki became aware that besides promotion, the choice of 
cinemas and the duration of exhibition were essential factors for success of the studio’s 
films, especially when they were in competition with major foreign films. For example, 
the releases of both Porco Rosso and Mononoke coincided with the Japanese releases of 
Steven Spielberg films Hook (1991) and Jurassic Park (1993) respectively, and Pom 
Poko with Disney’s The Lion King (1994). In all cases, the Ghibli films beat the 
American ones. One significant factor for the victory was that the Ghibli films were 
shown at more prestigious cinemas for longer periods than their American competitors. 
Japanese cities outside Tokyo in the early 1990s often had two cinemas at most where 
films distributed by Tōhō were shown. One of them tended to be less prestigious and 
smaller than the other. Thanks to Fumio Nishino of Tōhō, who began to work closely 
with Suzuki in the late 1980s, from Porco Rosso onwards, Ghibli films were shown at 
the larger cinemas. (Suzuki 2013a: 176-177, 182-183) For Mononoke, Suzuki again 
asked Nishino whether it was possible to show the film in best cinemas in Japan, many 
of which had already been booked for Jurassic Park. The executives of Tōhō were 
skeptical about Mononoke because of its grave and complicated theme that was totally 
different from previous Miyazaki films but Nishino persuaded them tomake a special 
arrangement for Mononoke. (Suzuki 2015: 69-70) In addition, by the time of Mononoke, 
cinema complexes were sprouting in Japan. The managers of these newer cinemas 
offered to show Ghibli films because the reputation of Miyazaki and Ghibli had already 
been firmly established. (Ichikawa, Ise, Okuda, Takai and Suzuki 2015: 13) Eventually, 
the film was opened in 260 cinemas in Japan out of 1,800 in total. (Kanō 2006: 211)  
By the time the film was released, interest in Mononoke in Japan had already surged, 
also helped by Miyazaki’s suggestion that this would be his last film. Mieko Hara, a 
designer at Tōhō working on newspaper advertisements for the film, recalls that she 
received phone calls from cinemas the evening immediately before the opening saying 
there were long queues outside the cinemas for advance tickets, even though the box 
offices were to be closed at seven, and that was something that had never happened 
before. (Studio Ghibli 2002: 345) The revenue for Mononoke easily achieved the target 
of 6 billion yen and eventually reached a staggering 11.3 billion yen to be the most 
successful film released in Japan at the time. (Studio Ghibli 2015: 49) The way 
Mononoke succeeded – a massive campaign making the full use of tie-in projects, 
previews and media coverage before release of the film leading to the heightening of 
interest for people for whom the names Ghibli and Miyazaki were already synonymous 
with high-quality animation features – indicates that the success of the film was not 
simply due to its content or technical achievement, but also to the success of previous 
Ghibli films and the massive promotional campaign that led to swelling expectation to 
the film. 
 
Conclusion 
After phenomenal success of Mononoke, Suzuki continued to coordinate promotion for 
Ghibli films as well as those from other studios such as Mamoru  Oshii’s 
Inosensu/Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence (2004). Miyazaki’s Sen to Chihiro no 
kamikakushi/Spirited Away (2001) earned no less than 3.04 billion yen to be the most 
successful film shown in Japan as of 2016. Other Miyazaki films such as Mononoke, 
Hauru no ugoku shiro/Howl’s Moving Castle (2004) and Gake no ue no Ponyo/Ponyo 
(2009) were among the ten most successful films shown in Japan until Ponyo was 
pushed out by another anime, Makoto Shinkai’s Kimi no na wa/Your Name (2016)  in 
2016, and other Ghibli films such as Kaze tachinu/The Wind Rises, Karigurashi no 
Arietti/Borrower Arietti (Yonebayashi, 2010), Gedo senki/Tales from Earthsea 
(Miyazaki Gorō, 2006) and double bill of Neko no ongaeshi/The Cat Returns (Morita, 
2002) and Giburīzu episōdo 2/Ghiblies episode 2 (Momose, 2002) are among the 100 
most successful films shown in Japan as of 2017, each ranked at eighteenth, 41st, 66th 
and 95th. (Kōgyō tsūshinsha, 2017) We should note that films by young and lesser 
known directors are also successful in terms of revenue, although not to the same degree 
as Miyazaki.  
These films, however, were not necessarily well-received. For example, Gedo senki, 
the first film directed by Miyazaki’s son Miyazaki Gorō, was severely criticized both in 
and outside Japan. A newspaper and two magazines in Japan (newspaper Supōtsu hōchi, 
weekly magazine Shūkan bunshun and film magazine Eiga hihyō) named the film as the 
worst one shown in Japan in that year. Ursula K. Le Guin, the author of the original 
novel, also commented that the film was ‘quickly made,’ ‘exciting’ but ‘incoherent,’ 
‘[t]he imagery is effective but often conventional’ and ‘does not have the delicate 
accuracy of "Totoro" or the powerful and splendid richness of detail of "Spirited Away."’ 
(Le Guin, 2006)  
These examples indicate that current ‘popularity’ of Ghibli films in Japan is not 
necessarily and simply owing to their quality as film but the name of Ghibli as a brand. 
As I attempted to show in this article, the brand was established not solely by excellent 
works by Miyazaki and Takahata as auteurs per se, but their commercial success that 
owes greatly to the strategies to sell films devised by Suzuki since the 1980s as well as 
the quality of the films. Suzuki, as much as, or in some aspects even more than, 
Takahata and Miyazaki, contributed to building and developing Ghibli, the castle in 
‘The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness,’ as Sunada Mami (2013) called it. 
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